First-party app · Browser Connector
browser-connector
Attach your own everyday browser to a PersonalClaw you already run. A browse task with target 'user_browser' can then act inside a session you are already logged into, and only in a tab it opens for itself: when you allow a task, the extension opens a new background tab in a tab group named after the task (or a window of its own, in a browser without tab groups), and the run never touches a tab you already have open. Close the group to stop the run; bring its tab to the front to take over, which pauses it. If the extension cannot open a tab of the run's own, the task is refused. The extension pairs with the gateway the way your phone does and talks to it over loopback only: its host permissions are loopback-only, and it opens no listening surface of its own. In your browser it asks for tabs (to open the run's tab and act on it), tab groups (to name the run's group and notice when you close it) and storage (its settings, and which tab belongs to which run). It speaks a narrow, closed contract: navigate, read-outline, click, type, close. It never reads, stores, or types into a password field.
Before you install
A first-party app of PersonalClaw v0.3.9
No scan on record before install
PersonalClaw publishes no scan of its own apps before you install one.
PersonalClaw runs its own scan of the actual code of every app it installs: this one is rescanned when you install, and that scan is what can stop an install.
Its row on Compare: install rescan
- Compatibility
- Works with PersonalClaw v0.3.9
What it gets
- Permissions
- api: ["/api/devices/pair/complete","/api/browse/connector"]
- Its own network permission
- Not declared in this release's manifest
What it reaches
- Hosts it names
- Not declared in this release's manifest
Its own code has no host list at this release: any hosts it names are for the programs, servers and sources it starts or fetches, not everything it can reach. Its own network permission is a declaration, not a fence.
Secrets you would enter
- Settings marked secret
- Not declared in this release's manifest
What installing it gives and runs
The manifest's own declarations, under the names install consent shows them by and in its order. The Store adds, at install, which of them run as you.
- Permissions it is granted
{ "api": [ "/api/devices/pair/complete", "/api/browse/connector" ] }
Not declared in this release's manifest:
- Scheduled jobs
- Python packages installed for it
- Engine packages it can install
- What it needs that PersonalClaw does not install
- Programs on this machine it starts
- npm packages installed for it
- Places outside its folder it writes
- Pages it adds to the dashboard
- Components it adds to the dashboard
- A server process of its own
- The sandbox tier its server runs in
- Provider modules the gateway loads
- Command run after install
- Command run after an update
- Command run when it is switched on
- Command run when it is switched off
- Command run before it is removed
- What it runs for personalclaw setup
- What it runs for personalclaw doctor
- Connector sources it parses
- MCP servers it adds
- Skills it installs
Where it comes from
- Publisher
- PersonalClaw
- License
- MIT
- Pinned commit
- 169cbc4f8fc59cd42a65a6a3546235bc49ab3b22
- Signer
- Not declared in this release's manifest
From review to enable
- Held and scanned. An install stages the app in quarantine, checks its signature, and runs the shared supply-chain scanner over the staged bytes before anything is shown for consent. A registry's recorded verdict is not read at install: the scan that can stop it is this one.Its row on Compare: install rescan
- A dangerous verdict ends it. A dangerous verdict returns a refusal before consent is asked, so there is no consent to give and no switch that skips it. A warning verdict asks for your consent instead.Its row on Compare: dangerous verdict
- You review and consent. The review records a digest of the staged bytes, and an install committed against different bytes is refused: it needs consent again, because the app changed after it was reviewed. An update that changes what the app gets asks for consent again too.Its row on Compare: consent
- Its setup runs, then you switch it on. Nothing it declares runs before your consent; an app already installed is offered as an update instead.
To install it and switch it on
- In PersonalClaw, open the Store.
- Find browser-connector.
- Review what it gets and runs, and consent.
- Install it, then switch it on.
Evidence
browser-connector/app.json at the pinned commit, as written, with the blob hash git lists for it: b864a260ad9bc566ec01a8f757ada80e77da6168
{
"name": "browser-connector",
"version": "0.1.2",
"displayName": "Browser Connector",
"description": "Attach your own everyday browser to a PersonalClaw you already run. A browse task with target 'user_browser' can then act inside a session you are already logged into, and only in a tab it opens for itself: when you allow a task, the extension opens a new background tab in a tab group named after the task (or a window of its own, in a browser without tab groups), and the run never touches a tab you already have open. Close the group to stop the run; bring its tab to the front to take over, which pauses it. If the extension cannot open a tab of the run's own, the task is refused. The extension pairs with the gateway the way your phone does and talks to it over loopback only: its host permissions are loopback-only, and it opens no listening surface of its own. In your browser it asks for tabs (to open the run's tab and act on it), tab groups (to name the run's group and notice when you close it) and storage (its settings, and which tab belongs to which run). It speaks a narrow, closed contract: navigate, read-outline, click, type, close. It never reads, stores, or types into a password field.",
"icon": "AppWindow",
"author": "PersonalClaw",
"license": "MIT",
"tags": [
"companion",
"browse",
"automation",
"extension"
],
"quality": {
"tested": true,
"designSystem": "n/a"
},
"permissions": {
"api": [
"/api/devices/pair/complete",
"/api/browse/connector"
]
},
"platform": {
"os": [
"macos",
"linux",
"windows"
],
"installMode": "client",
"clientInstall": {
"shell": "set -e; DEST=\"${PERSONALCLAW_HOME:-$HOME/.personalclaw}/apps/browser-connector\"; git clone --depth 1 --filter=blob:none --sparse https://github.com/PersonalClaw/PersonalClawApps \"$DEST\"; git -C \"$DEST\" sparse-checkout set browser-connector; echo \"Unpacked extension: $DEST/browser-connector/extension\"",
"postInstall": "echo \"Load the unpacked extension at ${PERSONALCLAW_HOME:-$HOME/.personalclaw}/apps/browser-connector/browser-connector/extension in your browser (developer mode), start the browser with a loopback --remote-debugging-port, then pair it from Settings -> Devices.\""
}
}
}
- Scan verdict
- No scan on record before install
- Scan time
- No scan is published before install
- Blocking findings
- No scan is published before install
- Scanner version
- No scan is published before install
PersonalClaw publishes no scan of its own apps before you install one.
Every app is scanned again when you install it, whatever its listing says.
An install stages the app in quarantine, checks its signature, and runs the shared supply-chain scanner over the staged bytes before anything is shown for consent. A registry's recorded verdict is not read at install: the scan that can stop it is this one.
apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9A dangerous scan verdict stops the install, and nothing overrides it.
A dangerous verdict returns a refusal before consent is asked, so there is no consent to give and no switch that skips it. A warning verdict asks for your consent instead.
apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9Consent covers exactly what you reviewed, and an app that changed asks again.
The review records a digest of the staged bytes, and an install committed against different bytes is refused: it needs consent again, because the app changed after it was reviewed. An update that changes what the app gets asks for consent again too.
apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9A setting an app marks secret is kept in the credential store and never shown back.
The app's settings file holds only a reference, the value lives in the credential store, and every route that shows settings masks it. The app's own code receives the value when it runs.
apps/secret_fields.py at v0.3.9
PersonalClaw/PersonalClawApps @ 169cbc4f8fc5 · browser-connector/app.json