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First-party app · Git Sync

git-sync

Sync PersonalClaw state between your machines through a git remote you own. The transport keeps a local working clone and moves durability shard objects as files it commits and pushes, so `git log -p` over the shards is a human-diffable audit history of what the assistant knows — the whole point of this transport. It stays plaintext (never encrypted) so that history stays readable; secrets are excluded upstream and never touch it.

Before you install

A first-party app of PersonalClaw v0.3.9

No scan on record before install

PersonalClaw publishes no scan of its own apps before you install one.

PersonalClaw runs its own scan of the actual code of every app it installs: this one is rescanned when you install, and that scan is what can stop an install.

Its row on Compare: install rescan

Compatibility
Works with PersonalClaw v0.3.9

What it gets

Permissions
  • network: true
Its own network permission
On. Its own network permission is a declaration, not a fence.

What it starts

The programs on this machine it starts, as install consent names them.

  • git: git keeps your synced PersonalClaw data in the working clone you set and syncs it with your remote: it clones, commits, pulls and pushes. With an Access token set, it signs in with that token instead of yours.

    It runs with your own git sign-in and settings, and with the git settings of the folder it works in, which can add rules of their own and commands for it to run. What those rules allow, it does without asking you here first.

What it reaches

Hosts it names
Not declared in this release's manifest

Its own code has no host list at this release: any hosts it names are for the programs, servers and sources it starts or fetches, not everything it can reach. Its own network permission is a declaration, not a fence.

Secrets you would enter

Settings marked secret
  • Access token

The app's settings file holds only a reference, the value lives in the credential store, and every route that shows settings masks it. The app's own code receives the value when it runs.

Its own code calls PersonalClaw's gateway with a token scoped to the app, not with your owner token.

What installing it gives and runs

The manifest's own declarations, under the names install consent shows them by and in its order. The Store adds, at install, which of them run as you.

Permissions it is granted
{
  "network": true
}
Programs on this machine it starts
[
  {
    "program": "git",
    "why": "git keeps your synced PersonalClaw data in the working clone you set and syncs it with your remote: it clones, commits, pulls and pushes. With an Access token set, it signs in with that token instead of yours.",
    "inherits": [
      "sign-in",
      "settings",
      "folder-settings"
    ]
  }
]
Provider modules the gateway loads
[
  {
    "type": "sync",
    "implementation": "provider:create_provider"
  }
]

Not declared in this release's manifest:

  • Scheduled jobs
  • Python packages installed for it
  • Engine packages it can install
  • What it needs that PersonalClaw does not install
  • npm packages installed for it
  • Places outside its folder it writes
  • Pages it adds to the dashboard
  • Components it adds to the dashboard
  • A server process of its own
  • The sandbox tier its server runs in
  • Command run after install
  • Command run after an update
  • Command run when it is switched on
  • Command run when it is switched off
  • Command run before it is removed
  • What it runs for personalclaw setup
  • What it runs for personalclaw doctor
  • Connector sources it parses
  • MCP servers it adds
  • Skills it installs

Where it comes from

Publisher
PersonalClaw
License
MIT
Pinned commit
169cbc4f8fc59cd42a65a6a3546235bc49ab3b22
Signer
Not declared in this release's manifest

From review to enable

  1. Held and scanned. An install stages the app in quarantine, checks its signature, and runs the shared supply-chain scanner over the staged bytes before anything is shown for consent. A registry's recorded verdict is not read at install: the scan that can stop it is this one.Its row on Compare: install rescan
  2. A dangerous verdict ends it. A dangerous verdict returns a refusal before consent is asked, so there is no consent to give and no switch that skips it. A warning verdict asks for your consent instead.Its row on Compare: dangerous verdict
  3. You review and consent. The review records a digest of the staged bytes, and an install committed against different bytes is refused: it needs consent again, because the app changed after it was reviewed. An update that changes what the app gets asks for consent again too.Its row on Compare: consent
  4. Its setup runs, then you switch it on. Nothing it declares runs before your consent; an app already installed is offered as an update instead.

To install it and switch it on

  1. In PersonalClaw, open the Store.
  2. Find git-sync.
  3. Review what it gets and runs, and consent.
  4. Install it, then switch it on.

Evidence

git-sync/app.json at the pinned commit, as written, with the blob hash git lists for it: e1d3ad01bc91d938a6f5a6395d0eb03f27ffe13f

Open it at the commit

{
  "name": "git-sync",
  "version": "0.1.13",
  "displayName": "Git Sync",
  "description": "Sync PersonalClaw state between your machines through a git remote you own. The transport keeps a local working clone and moves durability shard objects as files it commits and pushes, so `git log -p` over the shards is a human-diffable audit history of what the assistant knows — the whole point of this transport. It stays plaintext (never encrypted) so that history stays readable; secrets are excluded upstream and never touch it.",
  "icon": "GitBranch",
  "author": "PersonalClaw",
  "license": "MIT",
  "tags": [
    "sync",
    "bundled"
  ],
  "permissions": {
    "network": true
  },
  "launches": [
    {
      "program": "git",
      "why": "git keeps your synced PersonalClaw data in the working clone you set and syncs it with your remote: it clones, commits, pulls and pushes. With an Access token set, it signs in with that token instead of yours.",
      "inherits": [
        "sign-in",
        "settings",
        "folder-settings"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "provider": {
    "id": "sync",
    "label": "Sync through a git remote",
    "type": "sync",
    "implementation": "provider:create_provider",
    "capabilities": [
      "sync"
    ],
    "settingsSchema": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "repo_url": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Git remote URL",
            "help": "The ssh or https URL of a git remote you own (both machines point at the same one). A remote at a local path is refused, and so is an https URL with a user name or token written into it (put the token in Access token), or an ssh one with a password (ssh signs in with your key). Leave empty to configure later — the transport stays idle until set."
          }
        },
        "local_clone": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Local working clone",
            "help": "Where the working clone lives on this machine. Supports ~ and $VARS. Leave empty to keep it in PersonalClaw's home, under sync/git-sync. The transport clones the remote here on first use and reuses it after."
          }
        },
        "branch": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "main",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Branch",
            "help": "The branch to sync on. Both machines must use the same branch."
          }
        },
        "token": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "Access token",
            "help": "For an https remote that needs a token to sign in: an access token from your git host. It is kept in PersonalClaw's credential store and handed to git by its own credential helper, never written into the working clone or onto a command line. Only an https remote is given it (or an http one on this machine). Leave empty for ssh, which signs in with your ssh key: a token beside an ssh remote is refused.",
            "sensitive": true
          }
        },
        "username": {
          "type": "string",
          "default": "",
          "x-meta": {
            "label": "User name",
            "help": "The user name to sign in with alongside Access token, if your host wants one. Leave empty to sign in as x-access-token, which a host that checks only the token accepts; set your account's name for a host that wants it with its token. Leave empty for ssh."
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
Scan verdict
No scan on record before install
Scan time
No scan is published before install
Blocking findings
No scan is published before install
Scanner version
No scan is published before install

PersonalClaw publishes no scan of its own apps before you install one.

  • Every app is scanned again when you install it, whatever its listing says.

    An install stages the app in quarantine, checks its signature, and runs the shared supply-chain scanner over the staged bytes before anything is shown for consent. A registry's recorded verdict is not read at install: the scan that can stop it is this one.

    apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9
  • A dangerous scan verdict stops the install, and nothing overrides it.

    A dangerous verdict returns a refusal before consent is asked, so there is no consent to give and no switch that skips it. A warning verdict asks for your consent instead.

    apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9
  • Consent covers exactly what you reviewed, and an app that changed asks again.

    The review records a digest of the staged bytes, and an install committed against different bytes is refused: it needs consent again, because the app changed after it was reviewed. An update that changes what the app gets asks for consent again too.

    apps/app_manager.py at v0.3.9
  • A setting an app marks secret is kept in the credential store and never shown back.

    The app's settings file holds only a reference, the value lives in the credential store, and every route that shows settings masks it. The app's own code receives the value when it runs.

    apps/secret_fields.py at v0.3.9

PersonalClaw/PersonalClawApps @ 169cbc4f8fc5 · git-sync/app.json